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NATIONALIZATION DECREE OF 1950
On December 17, 1950, when the People's Republic of China
(PRC) intervened in Korea, the United States retaliated by freezing
$80.5 million of Chinese assets in the United States. ' On December
28, 1950, the PRC responded by nationalizing approximately $197
million of United States nationals' property in China.2 At the time
of the nationalization, the PRC failed to compensate the United
States nationals for their property. These American investors made
claims against the PRC for full compensation for nationalized
property. The PRC, in turn, requested the unblocking of its assets.
The claims of American investors against the PRC and the PRC's
1. The U.S. Treasury Department, under the authority of the Trading With the Enemy
Act, carried out the decision made by President Truman. See Trading With the Enemy Act
of 1917, 50 U.S.C. § I app. (1976); Proclamation No. 2914, 3 C.F.R. § 99 (1949-1953), re-
printed in 50 U.S.C. § 1 app. (1976). Executive power to block foreign assets arises from
amendments to § 5(b) of the Trading With the Enemy Act. The primary blocking provision
is The Foreign Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 500.201 (1983). It should be noted,
however, that blocking is a functionally descriptive term. Under 31 C.F.R. § 500.201, re-
moval of assets was prevented, but other specified forms of transfer were permitted. Owners
of assets could invest their assets in listed securities or transfer their funds from demand
accounts to interest-bearing accounts. Telephone interview with David Rogers, General
Counsel, China Claims Program, Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (Sept. 22, 1982).
The result was that the assets were, in effect, blocked. For specific blocking authority, see 50
U.S.C. § 5(b) app., § 6 (1976); Exec. Order No. 9193, 3 C.F.R. § 1174 (1938-1943) (amending
Exec. Order No. 9095, 3 C.F.R. 1121 (1938-1943)); 31 C.F.R. § 500 (1983).
2. The Chinese blocking controls on U.S. assets were imposed on December 28, 1950,
by order of the Government Administrative Council of the Central People's Government.
The Council is the highest governmental body charged with state administration. See The
Organic Law of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, Sept.
29, 1949, ch. III, in FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL DOCUMENTS OF COMMUNIST CHINA 104, 108-13
(A. Blaustein ed. 1962). The controls were intended to prevent the United States Govern-
ment from engaging in economic disruption and endangering the interests of the people of
China. After an initial freezing and inventory, general licensing authority over blocked
American assets was vested in national and regional government agencies. Local agencies
controlled the dispensation of blocked assets under guidelines issued by the national govern-
ment. For text of the blocking order, see New China News Agency, Daily Press Release No.
586, at 208 (Dec. 30, 1950). See also Government Administrative Council Issues Order for
the Control of American Government and Private Property in China (Dec. 28, 1950), re-
printedin J. COHEN & H. CHIU, PEOPLE'S CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL LAw 686-87 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Administrative Council Order].
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request for the unblocking of assets frozen by the United States
constitute what has become known as the claims/assets problem.
3
In 1966, the International Claims Settlement Act was amended
to evaluate United States nationals' claims against the PRC.4 Fi-
nally, in 1979 the United States and the PRC entered into an agree-
ment to settle the claims/assets problem.' This agreement is called
the "Agreement Between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the People's Republic of China
Concerning the Settlement of Claims" (PRC Claims Agreement).
The PRC Claims Agreement permits the PRC to reclaim the
assets and accounts frozen by the United States in 1950.' This
Agreement also provides that the PRC shall remit to the United
States government a lump-sum payment.' This lump-sum payment
entitles the average United States claimant to a mere forty-one per-
cent compensation for his property nationalized by the PRC.9 As a
consequence, the PRC Claims Agreement has left many United
States claimants dissatisfied.
This Comment will evaluate the international importance of
the PRC Claims Agreement both from a legal and foreign policy
viewpoint. This evaluation will begin with a presentation of a his-
torical background leading up to the PRC Claims Agreement.
United States claimants' rights to full compensation under interna-
tional law and United States law will also be discussed.
Following this discussion, the United States' response to the
claims/assets problem will be outlined. This presentation will be-
gin with an examination of the jurisdiction of the Foreign Claims
3. "Claims/assets" is a term commonly used to refer to United States Clms against
the PRC and to PRC assets blocked by the United States.
4. The International Claims Settlement Act of 1949 was amended in 1964 by adding
Title V. The purpose of Title V was to provide for the determination of the amount and
validity of claims against the government of Cuba. Pub. L. No. 88-666, 78 Stat. 1100 (1964)
(approved Oct. 16, 1964).
Title V was amended in 1966 in order to provide for the determination of the amount of
the claims of United States nationals against the Chinese Communist regime. Pub. L. No.
89-780, 80 Stat. 1365 (1964) (approved Nov. 6, 1966).
5. See supra note 3.
6. Agreement Concerning the Settlements of Claims, May 11, 1979, United States--
People's Republic of China, 30 U.S.T. 1957, T.I.A.S. No. 9306, reprinted in 18 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 337 (1979) [hereinafter cited as PRC Claims Agreement].
7. Id. art. 11(b).
8. Id. art. 11(a).
9. This 41% figure represents the ratio of 80.5 million dollars (the lump sum to be paid
by the PRC under the PRC Claims Agreement) to 197 million dollars (the total value of
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Settlement Commission (FCSC) to preadjudicate claims. This will
be followed by an analysis of the significance of United States rec-
ognition of the PRC and an examination of the provisions of the
PRC Claims Agreement.
The United States claimants' theories for recovery against the
United States government for inadequate compensation will next
be evaluated. A discussion of United States policy considerations
with regard to foreign nationalization of United States foreign in-
vestments will follow. This discussion will demonstrate that the
PRC Claims Agreement failed to properly consider the importance
of economic relations as a part of foreign relations. Mindful of this
consideration, this Comment will conclude with a proposed policy
change directing the United States to require full compensation for
American assets nationalized by foreign governments.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE CLAIMS/ASSETS PROBLEM
The PRC Claims Agreement may have resolved, at least pro-
cedurally, the claims/assets problem."0 The Agreement covers
United States claims against the PRC and PRC assets blocked by
the United States. Although the claims/assets problem has exten-
sive historical and political roots and far-reaching implications, its
complexity can be reduced to a series of factual occurrences.
In 1928 the United States recognized the Nationalist govern-
ment of the Republic of China.'l This recognition continued with-
out issue until the People's Republic of China was proclaimed on
October 1, 1949.12 The establishment of the PRC was the first of a
number of occurrences which created an international, political and
legal milieu complicating the United States' position toward both
"Chinas."
During the Nationalist government attempts to reassert control
over the mainland, the United States indirectly aided the National-
ists while imposing economic sanctions against the PRC in the form
of a trade embargo. 3 The United States' position with regard to
10. PRC Claims Agreement, supra note 6, art. 11(a).
11. J. FAIRBANK, THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA 254-61 (3d ed. 1962); R. FERRELL,
AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 344-46, 462-65 (1959).
12. This is the date of the establishment of the PRC. See generally 2 J. FAIRBANK, E.
REISCHAUER & A. CRAIG, A HISTORY OF EAST ASIAN CIVILIZATION 678-88 (1965).
13. See Cohen, Chinese Law and Sino-American Trade, in CHINA TRADE PROSPECTS
AND U.S. POLICY 312 (A. Eckstein ed. 1971); Lee & McCobb, United States Trade Embargo
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providing aid to the Nationalist government, therefore, evidenced a
hesitation to address the problem of recognition. The United States
had to decide which Chinese government should be accorded rec-
ognition. The most definitive action taken by the United States,
with regard to its treatment of the PRC, came after the PRC's De-
cember 17, 1950, intervention in Korea. 4
The claims/assets problem actually grew out of President Tru-
man's response to the PRC's Korean involvement. 5 Under the di-
rection of President Truman and pursuant to the Trading With the
Enemy Act, 16 the United States Treasury Department blocked all
assets and accounts of both Chinese governments and all Chinese
nationals.' 7 On December 28, 1950, the PRC responded to this ac-
tion by nationalizing all public and private assets of all natural and
juridical citizens of the United States.' 8 The result was the claims/
assets problem, which involved approximately $80.5 million of Chi-
nese assets blocked in the United States, and nearly $200 million of
United States claims to property nationalized in the PRC.' 9
The United States Congress recognized the need for a forum in
14. This action was the blocking, in effect, of all Chinese assets and accounts in the
United States. See infra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
15. Proclamation No. 2914, 3 C.F.R. § 99 (1949-1953), reprinted in 50 U.S.C.S. § I app.
(Law Co-op. 1981). Citing the "recent events in Korea and elsewhere," President Truman
declared that "world conquest by communist imperialism is the goal of the forces of aggres-
sion that have been loosed upon the world." 1d. Truman then proclaimed "the existence of
a national emergency, which requires that the military, naval, air, and civilian defenses of
this country be strengthened as speedily as possible to the end that we may be able to repel
any and all threats against our national security and to fulfill our responsibilities in the ef-
forts being made through the United Nations and otherwise to bring about lasting peace."
id
16. Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917, 50 U.S.C. § I app. (1970).
17. Proclamation No. 2914, 3 C.F.R. § 99 (1949-1953), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § I app.
(1976).
18. Administrative Council Order, supra note 2.
19. The United States Treasury Department investigated United States claims of prop-
erty seized in the PRC and made an accounting of all PRC assets blocked in the United
States. For an analysis of the blocking of Chinese assets in the United States, see Bayar, The
Blocked Chinese Assets: Present Status and Future Disposition, 15 VA. J. INT'L L. 959 (1975);
Lee, The United States and the People's Republic of China: The BlockedAssets-Claims Prob-
lem, 8 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 253 (1975).
On July 6, 1969, the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (FCSC) concluded that
384 United States nationals had lost approximately 197 million dollars of property as a result
of nationalization, expropriation, intervention or other taking by the Chinese Communist
regime. UNITED STATES FOREIGN CLAIMS SETTLEMENT COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT TO
THE CONGRESS 13-14 (1970).
An accounting by the Office of Foreign Assets Control revealed that as of July 1, 1970,
roughly 76.5 million dollars of PRC assets were blocked in the United States. Office of
Foreign Assets Control, U.S. Treasury Dep't 1970 Census of Blocked Chinese Assets in the
4
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 14, No. 1 [], Art. 7
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol14/iss1/7
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
which United States citizens could bring their claims against the
PRC regarding the taking, confiscation or nationalization of Amer-
ican property. Accordingly, the Foreign Claims Settlement Com-
mission (FCSC) was established.2" In 1966 the FCSC was
authorized by an amendment to Title V of the International Claims
Settlement Act of 1949 to determine claims of United States nation-
als against the Chinese Communist regime.2' Under Title V, the
FCSC was given exclusive jurisdiction over such claims.22
The FCSC was directed to "receive and determine the claims
of United States nationals against the PRC, arising since October 1,
1949.1123 Accordingly, United States nationals with such claims
were directed to follow specific filing procedures outlined by the
FCSC.
2 4
The FCSC's program for the receipt and determination of
United States 1 (1970) (unpublished manuscript available from the Office of Foreign Assets
Control).
The Office of Foreign Assets Control's estimates of PRC blocked assets were later re-
vised to 80.5 million dollars at the time of the PRC Claims Agreement. United States De-
partment of Treasury, Press Release (Sept. 28, 1979), reprinted in L.A. Times, Sept. 3, 1979,
§ 1, at 1, col. I [hereinafter cited as Press Release].
20. The FCSC was created by the President's Reorganization Plan No. I of 1954, 68
Stat. 1279 (codified in the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949, 22 U.S.C. § 1622
(1976)), which assigned the functions of the War Claims Commission and the International
Claims Commission to the FCSC.
21. Under the 1966 amendment of Title V of the International Claims Settlement Act of
1949, the FCSC was authorized to determine, in accordance with applicable principles of
substantive law, including international law, the validity and amount of certain claims of
U.S. nationals against the PRC. See Cuban Claims Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 1110 (1964) (codi-
fied as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 1643 (1976)). When Congress amended Title V to authorize
the China Claims Program, it made no substantive changes other than to allow the determi-
nation of claims against the PRC arising since October 1, 1949. Thus, the statutory standards
were the same in both the Cuban and China Claims Programs. Id.
22. FCSC Regulations, 45 C.F.R. § 503.1(b) (1983).
23. In the subcommittee hearing on S.3675, the bill authorizing the China Claims Pro-
gram, Ambassador Richard D. Kearney, then Deputy Legal Advisor to the Department of
State explained that:
[The] October 1, 1949, date was selected because it was only after that date that the
Chinese Communist regime began to nationalize and take American property.
This is the cutoff date by which we can determine that from that time on there were
takings of American property by the regime on the basis of all the information we
have.
Hearing on S. 3675 Before the Subcomm. on the Far East and the Pacific of the House Comm.
on Foreign Affairs, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 4, 7 (1966). See also, Cuban Claims Act of 1964, 78
Stat. 1110 (1964) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 1643 (1976)).
24. FCSC Regulations, 45 C.F.R. § 531 (1983); see FCSC Form No. 780, reprinted in
United States Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, Final Report of the China Claims
Program, § III, at 431, reprintedfrom UNITED STATES FOREIGN CLAIMS SETTLEMENT COM-
MISSION ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS (1972) (available from the FCSC, 1111 20th St.
N. W., Washington, D.C. 20579) [hereinafter cited as FCSC 1972 ANNUAL REPORT].
Vol. 14
5
Pinard: United States Policy Regarding Nationalization of American Invest
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons,
NATIONALIZATION OF AMERICAN INVESTMENTS
United States nationals' claims, the China Claims Program, com-
menced on November 8, 1967, when appropriations for administer-
ing the statute were made available.25 The deadline for filing such
claims with the FCSC was July 6, 1969.26 By that date, 508 claims
totaling $306,680,834 were filed with the Commission.27 By July 6,
1972, the completion of the China Claims Program, 384 claims had
been certified. 28 The total value of awards granted by the Commis-
sion was $196,861,824.29
On the international level, the Joint Communiqfie (Shanghai
Communiqfie), issued at the conclusion of President Nixon's 1972
China trip, marked the beginning of the United States' interest in
extending recognition to the PRC.30 The Shanghai Communiqf~e
expressed the positions of the PRC and the United States in regard
to prerequisites for the establishment of full diplomatic relations
between the two countries.3'
Shortly after this rapprochement began, the two countries
agreed to condition the unblocking of PRC assets with the settle-
ment of United States claims for seized property.32 In 1973 an
agreement in principle was reached.3 3 United States officials ex-
pected a rapid resolution of the problem.34 However, it was not
until 1977 that the PRC actively sought to negotiate a final settle-
ment agreement.35
The international economic situation of the PRC had deterio-
rated by 1976.36 As a result, the PRC reinitiated diplomatic level
discussions with the United States early in 1977 regarding the set-
25. FCSC 1972 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 24, at 417.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 506.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Joint Communiqoe, Feb. 28, 1972, United States-People's Republic of China, 6
DEP'T ST. BULL. 435 (1972), reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 443 (1972).
31. Id.
32. Presidential Assistant Kissinger Visits Asia, 68 DEP'T ST. BULL. 313, 315 (1973).
33. Id.
34. Joint U.S -Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs Holds Meeting at Tokyo,
69 DEP'T ST. BULL. 237, 239 (1973).
35. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1977, at Al, col. 3 for a report of the U.S. receiving indica-
tions that China would like to begin talks on settling financial claims on the way to the
normalization of trade relations. See also Guertzman, U.S. Quietly Begins Talks With Chi-
nese on Financial Claims, N.Y. Times, May 2, 1977, at AI, col. 6.
36. See China Said to Falter in Its Economy in '76, N.Y. Times, Mar. 20, 1977, at A4,
col. 1. For the relationship of the business climate between the PRC and the U.S., see Doing
Business With China, N.Y. Times, May 9, 1977, at A30, col. 1. See also The Chinese Seem to
Mean Business, N.Y. Times, Mar. 24, 1977, at A26, col. 1.
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tlement of the claims/assets problem.37 However, a final solution
was not agreed upon until two years later.38 The primary reason
for the delay was that the United States could not make a binding
settlement agreement until the PRC was granted recognition.
39
Recognition of the People's Republic of China occurred on
January 1, 1979.40 Negotiations for the final resolution of the
claims/assets problem began almost immediately thereafter. While
visiting the United States in January 1979, Vice Premier Deng
Xiaoping met with President Carter and Treasury Secretary Blu-
menthal to discuss the claims/assets problem. 41 Negotiations con-
tinued until May 11, 1979, when the PRC Claims Agreement was
signed at Beijing by PRC Finance Minister Zhang Jingfu and U.S.
Commerce Secretary Juanita Kreps.42
The PRC Claims Agreement covered all claims of United
States nationals arising between October 1, 1949, and May 11,
1979, and all PRC claims (to the blocked assets) arising between
December 17, 1950, and May 11, 1979. 43 Under the Agreement, the
PRC agreed to pay a lump sum of $80.5 million to the United
States government over a five-year period.44 The United States
government agreed to accept this payment as the full and final set-
tlement of all United States nationals' claims covered by the Agree-
ment.45  Further, the United States agreed to unblock the $80.5
37. See Guertzman, supra note 35.
38. See PRC Claims Agreement, supra note 6.
39. See infra notes 134-65 and accompanying text.
40. The United States officially recognized The People's Republic of China on January
1, 1979. See 79 DEP'T ST. BULL. 2022 (1979); see also Establishment of Diplomatic Relations
Between P.R.C and U.S.A., PEKING REV., Dec. 22, 1978, at 8, 8-9.
41. The details of the settlement were negotiated within two months, and a draft of the
PRC Claims Agreement was initialed by U.S. Treasury Secretary W. Michael Blumenthal
and PRC officials in Beijing. U.S. Trade Pact Initialed, 39 FACTS ON FILE 369, 370, (1979)
[hereinafter cited as U.S. Trade Pact Initialed].
On May 10, 1979, the United States officially upgraded its liason office in Beijing to full
embassy status and officially closed its embassy in Taipei, Taiwan. Accord Reached on As-
sets, 39 FACTS ON FILE 146 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Accord Reached on Assets].
An account of the negotiations process was given by Robert Mundheim, General Coun-
sel of the Treasury Department at a July 27, 1979, meeting of the Advisory Committee on
East-West Trade. For a summary of Mr. Mundheim's comments, see Mundheim, Claims/
Assets Agreement With PRC" What It Means, How It Was Negotiated, Bus. AM. July 16,
1979, at 7, 8 [hereinafter cited as Mundheim].
42. The agreement was the same as a draft initialed in Beijing on March 1, 1979, by
Chinese officials and U.S. Treasury Secretary W. Michael Blumenthal, U.S. Trade Pact Ini-
tialed, supra note 41. See also, PRC Claims Agreement, supra note 6.
43. PRC Claims Agreement, supra note 6, art. I.
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million of PRC assets which had been frozen by the Treasury De-
partment in 1950.46 Under the terms of the PRC Claims Agree-
ment, United States claimants receive an average of 41 cents on
each dollar of his certified claim.47 Under both international and
United States law, United States claimants contend that they are
entitled to full compensation for their nationalized property.
Claimants further argue that the PRC Claims Agreement violates
both international and domestic law.
II. NATIONALIZATION-THE RIGHT TO FULL COMPENSATION
United States claimants argue that they have a right, cogniza-
ble under international and United States law, to full compensation
for their property taken by nationalization. Under international
law, the theory of acquired rights supports their right to full com-
pensation.48 To determine whether United States law requires full
compensation, (1) the Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations
Law,4 9 (2) the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act,50 (3) the act of
state doctrine, 51 and (4) the Hickenlooper Amendment5 2 will be
examined.
A. International La--Acquired Rights Theory
The duty to compensate involves the relationship between mu-
nicipal law which creates property rights and international law.5 3
A foreigner owns property abroad by operation of the local law of
the host State, which either recognizes property rights acquired by
the foreigner in other jurisdictions or allows their creation under
municipal law.54 Once property rights have been acquired and rec-
ognized, these rights become subject to the international law theory
46. Id. art. II(b). Article II(b) was amended by an agreement between the parties on
September 28, 1979. As the PRC requested, the United States agreed to postpone the un-
blocking of the assets from October 1, 1979, to January 31, 1980. Agreement Amending the
Agreement of May 11, 1979, September 28, 1979, United States-People's Republic of China,
31 U.S.T. 5596, T.I.A.S. No. 9675.
47. Soloman, When 41 Cents on the Dollar is a Good Deal, Christian Sci. Monitor, Mar.
28, 1979, at 23, col. I (Anthony M. Solomon reporting as Undersecretary for Monetary Af-
fairs, U.S. Treasury Dep't).
48. See infra notes 53-59.
49. See infra notes 64-68.
50. See infra notes 69-80.
51. See infra notes 81-87.
52. See infra notes 88-89.
53. For an excellent discussion, see Cheng, The Rationale of Compensationfor Expropri-
ation, 44 TRANSNAT'L GROTIUS Soc'Y 267 (1959).
54. Id.
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of acquired rights.55 The theory of acquired rights does not pre-
clude the enactment of laws changing legal institutions "closely
connected with moral, political and economic motives and pur-
poses," but requires only that "when the suppressed rights are of
economic value, equity requires compensation to be given."56
Several policy arguments support the acquired rights theory.
First, there is the necessity for a confidence in the "continued effi-
cacy . . . of judicial acts performed for the acquisition of rights
according to prevailing law."57 In other words, unless persons
whose rights have been recognized by a foreign country have secur-
ity in the future status of their rights, the acquisition and recogni-
tion of those rights would be meaningless. Second, compensation
under the acquired rights theory does not represent reparation for a
wrong, but provides for the alleviation of an inequitable hardship.58
In this way, a determination of fault per se is not made, but an
injured party is nevertheless made whole by the requirement of
compensation. Finally, individuals whose property rights have
been acquired and recognized can not be expected to sacrifice those
rights unless they have been at fault themselves. The acquired
rights theory protects these individuals by requiring compensation
for the suppression of their economic rights.59
55. The principle of acquired rights is a theory in which certain ownership rights (inso-
far as they may be classed as "rights" as opposed to expectancies), once acquired, are to some
extent immutable despite certain changes in the law. In other words, certain rights are pre-
served despite changes in law. For a more detailed discussion, see Kaekenbeeck, The Protec-
tion of Vested Rights in International Law, 17 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1 (1936).
56. Kaekenbeeck contends that compensation is required only by principles of equity
and not by law. Id. at 3-4.
57. Id. Kaekenbeeck concludes that the opposite principle "would be impractical and
mean a perpetual revolution in the state of rights and property." Id.
58. Id. at 16.
Individual confiscation of property without indemnity undoubtedly falls short of
the international standard of civilized society because it violates the sense of equity
of the civilized world, on which its deepest legal convictions rest, which is at the
root of all legislation on expropriation and which has been ratified by long interna-
tional custom ....
Id.
Kaekenbeeck suggests that judicial elaboration is necessary to ascertain a worldwide
international minimum standard for equitable compensation. According to Kaekenbeeck,
judicial elaboration must occur with the clear understanding that the ground for compensa-
tion is not reparation of a wrong, but alleviation of an exceptional hardship. Id.
It is likely that other commentators would suggest that the payment of compensation is
more a legal duty than a moral obligation. See, e.g., McNair, The Seizure of Property and
Enterprise in Indonesia, 6 NEDERLANDS TIDSCHRIFr VOOR INTERNATIONAL RECHT 216, 221-
37, 249-53 (1959).
59. Kaekenbeeck, supra note 58, at 3-4.
Vol. 14
9
Pinard: United States Policy Regarding Nationalization of American Invest
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons,
NATIONALIZATION OF AMERICAN INVESTMENTS
The PRC's nationalization of United States nationals' property
is a situation to which the acquired rights theory could be applied.
Prior to the PRC's nationalization decree, the PRC recognized the
rights of United States nationals to their property located in the
PRC. Hence, if the acquired rights theory were to be applied to the
PRC's nationalization of American investments, the PRC would be
obligated to pay full compensation to United States claimants.
Therefore, under an acquired rights analysis, the PRC Claims
Agreement violates international law since it does not provide for
full compensation.
Unfortunately for United States claimants, the acquired rights
theory is not the only law applicable to the claims/assets problem.
United States law plays an important role in the determination of
claimants' rights to full compensation.
B. United States Law
Under the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law,
United States claimants have a strong argument that they are enti-
tled to full compensation for their property which was nationalized
by the PRC.6° The PRC has two possible defenses to this assertion.
First, they can claim immunity from suit by private United States
citizens under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. 6' Second,
they can assert the act of state doctrine to make their acts nonre-
viewable by the United States courts.62 The Hickenlooper Amend-
ment is also important to this discussion of claimants' rights to full
compensation. The Hickenlooper Amendment provides sanctions
against foreign governments which nationalize United States na-
tionals' property without providing full compensation.63
1. Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the
United States. According to the Restatement, a taking by a State of
the property of an alien is wrongful under international law if there
is no reasonable provision for the determination and payment of
just compensation.' 4 The position of the United States in this re-
60. See infra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
61. See infra notes 69-80 and accompanying text.
62. See infra notes 81-87 and accompanying text.
63. See infra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
64. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
Section 185 (1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT (SECOND)]. The language of this sec-
tion provides that: "The taking by a state of property of an alien is wrongful under interna-
tional law if. . .there is not reasonable provision for the determination and payment of just
10
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gard has been reflected in a number of commercial treaties. For
example, Article VI, section 3 of the Treaty of 1953 with Japan
provides:
Property of nationals of either Party shall not be taken within the
territories of the other Party except for a public purpose, nor
shall it be taken without the prompt payment of just compensa-
tion. Such compensation shall be in an effectively realizable
form and shall represent the full equivalent of the property
taken; and adequate provision shall have been made at or prior
to the time of taking for the determination and payment
thereof.
65
The United States policy on the protection of United States private
property is clearly stated in the Restatement. At section 185 the
United States recognizes the right of any country to expropriate the
property of a United States investor, in the absence of specific gov-
ernmental undertakings to the contrary, so long as the taking is
nondiscriminatory; for a public purpose; and accompanied by
prompt, adequate and effective compensation.66
A public statement issued by the Department of State on De-
cember 30, 1975, entitled "Foreign Investment and Nationaliza-
tion," reiterates the policy of the Restatement.67 The text of the
statement includes the following language:
With regard to current or future expropriations of property or
contractual interests of U.S. nationals, . . . the Department of
State wishes to place on record its view that foreign investors are
entitled to the fair market value of their interests. Acceptance by
U.S. nationals of less than fair market value does not constitute
acceptance of any other standard by the United States govern-
ment. As a consequence, the United States government reserves
its rights to maintain international claims for what it regards as
adequate compensation under international law for the interests
compensation, as defined in section 187 .... .. Section 187(a) specifies "adequate" com-
pensation, as indicated in section 188. Section 188(1) imposes a requirement of'"full value of
the property taken" which is defined at comment b as "fair market value as reasonably de-
fined in light of the international standard of justice." 1d. § 188(1) comment b. In addition,
the Restatement suggests that the rules it presents on this issue "are probably less widely
recognized than most rules of international law." Id. § 184 comment c. The Hickenlooper
Amendment is similar. Foreign Assistance Act of 1971, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(1)(c) (1972).
65. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Apr. 2, 1953, United States-Ja-
pan, art. VI, § 3, 2 U.S.T. 2063, 2068, T.I.A.S. No. 2863, 206 U.N.T.S. 143.
66. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 64, § 185(b).
67. U.S. Dep't State, Foreign Investment and Nationalization (Dec. 30, 1975), quoted in
Smith, The United States Government Perspective on Expropriation and Investment in Develop-
ing Countries, 6 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 517, 520-21 (1976).
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nationalized or transferred.68
This statement further supports the claimants' contention that they
are entitled to full compensation for their property which was na-
tionalized by the PRC. However, whether full compensation
should be provided largely depends upon the validity of the PRC's
defenses under the theories of foreign sovereign immunity and the
act of state doctrine.
2. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. Under the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, the PRC could invoke immu-
nity from the exercise of jurisdiction by the United States over the
PRC's sovereign activities.6 9 Prior to the Foreign Sovereign Immu-
nities Act, the accepted international law theory was that States and
other international legal persons were immune from the exercise of
jurisdiction by another State over sovereign acts.7 Originally, a
State could invoke jurisdictional immunity irrespective of the na-
ture of its sovereign acts.7 ' In recent years, as States have become
increasingly involved in commercial activities, the application of
the theory of sovereign immunity has been limited.72 One excep-
tion to the general theory of foreign sovereign immunity, recog-
nized by the United States, is provided in the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976. 73 Under this Act, a foreign State shall not
be immune from the jurisdiction of either United States federal or
state courts in any case in which its action is based upon commer-
68. Id. at 521-22.
69. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 establishes exceptions to the general
principle of foreign sovereign immunity. The inapplicability of any such exceptions would
result in immunity for the PRC from suit by U.S. private citizens. Foreign Sovereign Immu-
nities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1391, 1602, 1604, 1605(a) (1976).
70. The theory of absolute sovereign immunity was applied by the United States
Supreme Court in The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, II U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
This theory supports absolute and territorial jurisdiction in every sovereign which may only
be waived in certain specific instances. The Court outlined three instances where such a
waiver may occur. First, where the person of the foreign sovereign is present in the foreign
territory, he shall be exempted from arrest or detention within the foreign territory. Second,
where foreign ministers are present in the foreign territory, they shall be immune from suit.
Third, where a sovereign allows the troops of a foreign prince to pass through his sovereign
territory, he shall be understood to have ceded a portion of his territorial jurisdiction. Id. at
138-40. This theory supports the authority of the PRC to nationalize property within its
territorial boundaries.
71. Id.
72. Dralle v. Republic of Czechoslovakia, 17 I.L.R. 155 (Aus. Sup. Ct. 1950). See also
Letter of Acting Legal Adviser, Jack B. Tate, to Acting Attorney General, Philip B. Perlman
(May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 DEP'T ST. BULL. 984 (1952).
73. See supra note 69.
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cial activities carried on within the United States.74
This commercial activity exception to foreign sovereign immu-
nity was held applicable in Jackson v. The People's Republic of
China.7 In Jackson, a United States district court held that the
PRC was subject to United States jurisdiction.76 Jackson involved
bearer railroad bonds issued by the Imperial Chinese government
in 1911.17 These bonds were in default, and United States investors
brought suit to compel payment on them.78 Based upon the finding
that United States investment in the bonds was solicited by the Im-
perial Chinese government, the district court invoked the commer-
cial activity exception of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and
held that the PRC was not immune from United States jurisdic-
tion.7 9 The Court subsequently entered a default judgment against
the PRC.8°
74. Claimants can assert that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 provides
jurisdiction to United States courts. Section 1605 specifically provides:
General exceptions to the jurisdictional immunity of a foreign state
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the
United States or of the states in any case-...
(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the
United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United States in
connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act
outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity
of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 19 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1976).
75. Jackson v. People's Republic of China, 550 F. Supp. 869 (N.D. Ala. 1982).
76. Id. at 872-73.
77. Id. at 871.
78. Plaintiffs in the Jackson case brought a class action as holders of the bonds. The
Jackson plaintiffs (Russell Jackson, the lead plaintiff) had purchased the bonds at a reduced
rate from the original purchasers. Id. at 870.
79. Id. at 872-73.
80. Id. at 877. For a cogent analysis of the Jackson case and an excellent discussion of
the issues involved in the claims/assets problem, see Jung & Salper, U.S. Claims Against
China: Are They Settled?, 2 CHINA L. REP. 89 (1982).
For the PRC's reaction to the Jackson decision, see Parks, Peking Upset- U.S. Court
Wants 1911 Bonds Paid Off, L.A. Times, Feb. 10, 1983, at 1, col. 5; see also China Rejects
U.S. Court Ruling 26 BEIJING REV., Feb. 21, 1983, at 8.
For a strong criticism of the Jackson decision, see Zhu, U.S. Court Trial Violates Inter-
national Law, 26 BEIJING REV., Mar. 14, 1983, at 24. Subsequent to the Jackson decision,
the Executive Branch was requested by Chinese officials to intervene in the decision and
deny its effect. See Wren, Separation of Powers? You Must Be Kidding Says China, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 20, 1983, § IV, at 5, col. 1.
In January of 1984, the U.S. government filed a "statement of interest" in the case with
U.S. District Court Judge U.W. Clemon, urging that the default judgment against China be
set aside. An accompanying declaration by Secretary of State George Shultz noted that the
default judgment had become a "significant issue in bilateral U.S.-China relations" and that
Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping had raised the issue forcefully with him during the Secre-
tary's visit to Peking in 1983. "The manner in which these proceedings are finally resolved
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In sum, if the United States claimants can establish that their
investments in China were solicited by the PRC, they could argue
that the commercial activity exception to foreign sovereign immu-
nity should apply to the claims/assets problem. If the exception
were applied, the PRC would not be immune from suit. However,
even if United States jurisdiction were established, the PRC could
assert that the act of state doctrine prevents a United States court
from reviewing its nationalization decree.
3. The Act of State Doctrine. The classic American definition
of the act of state doctrine is found in Underhill v. Hernandez.
There the Supreme Court stated:
Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of
every other sovereign state, and the courts of one country will
not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another,
done within its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of
such acts must be obtained through the means open to be availed
of by sovereign powers as between themselves.
8'
This doctrine is often used by the United States to avoid determin-
ing whether acts of foreign governments are in violation of interna-
tional law. 2
The Supreme Court invoked the act of state doctrine to avoid
making such a determination in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabba-
fino.8 In Sabbatino, the Court considered whether expropriation
of United States nationals' property by the Cuban government,
can be expected . . . to have ramifications for other important U.S. interests with respect to
China," the Secretary added. Mr. Shultz also made it clear that Beijing officials had implied
that Chil- would seize U.S. property in China W te Aabama court Ordered the seizure of
Chinese property in the U.S. to satisfy the default judgment.
W. Eugene Rutledge, the Birmingham attorney representing the bondholders, said he
intended to fight against dismissal of the case and, failing that, would "appeal as far as we
can appeal it. I am concerned that a foreign government that has incurred debt tries to avoid
payment and that [the U.S. government] will assist them in it. . . . It is a terrible precedent
...that will come back to haunt us." Kramer, Judge Sets Aside $43 Million Judgment
Against China After the U.S. Intervenes, Wall St. J., Feb. 29, 1984, at 30, col. 4.
Judge Clemon set aside the Jackson judgment on February 27, 1984. Clemon said in a
telephone interview on the same day that he would allow both sides 14 days to request a
hearing on the merits of the case. See Chen, Judge Voids Judgment on Chinese Bonds, L.A.
Times, Feb. 28, 1984, § I, at 3, col. 3.
81. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897). See also United States v. Pink,
315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937); Shapleigh v. Mier, 299
U.S. 468 (1937); Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304 (1918); Oetjen v. Central
Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918); American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347
(1909).
82. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 64, § 185 reporter's note 1.
83. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
14
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 14, No. 1 [], Art. 7
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol14/iss1/7
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
without compensation, constituted a violation of international
law.8 4 The Supreme Court agreed with the lower court that the
taking violated international law but reversed their decision on
other grounds.85 In Sabbatino, the Court determined that there was
insufficient reason to deny the application of the act of state
doctrine.86
The language in the closing section of the Sabbatino opinion
indicates a seemingly necessary, yet reluctant application of the act
of state doctrine.
However offensive to the public policy of this country and its
constituent States an expropriation of this kind may be, we con-
clude that both the national interest and progress toward the goal
of establishing the rule of law among nations are best served by
maintaining intact the act of state doctrine in this realm of its
application.
87
Under a Sabbatino analysis, the PRC's nationalization decree
would be respected no matter how offensive it was to United States
public policy regarding the taking of United States citizens' prop-
erty without just compensation. Although this analysis may be a
correct projection of the application of Sabbatino, the United States
still has a vehicle with which it may voice its disapproval of such an
act. This vehicle is the concurrent application of the Hickenlooper
Amendment.88




88. Originally called the Sabbatino amendment due to its relationship to the Sabbatino
case, the amendment is now known as the Hickenlooper Amendment since it was proposed
by Senator Hickenlooper. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee's report on the Hick-
enlooper Amendment stated in part:
The amendment is intended to reverse in part the recent decision of the Supreme
Court in Banco de [sic] Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino. The act-of-state doctrine
has been applied by U.S. courts to determine that the actions of a foreign sovereign
cannot be challenged in private litigation. The Supreme Court extended this doc-
trine in the Sabbatino decision so as to preclude U.S. courts from inquiring into
acts of foreign states, even though these acts had been denounced by the State De-
partment as contrary to international law . . . . The effect of the amendment is to
achieve a reversal of presumptions. Under the Sabbatino decision, the courts
would presume that any adjudication as to the lawfulness under international law
of the act of a foreign state would embarass the conduct of foreign policy unless the
President says it would not. Under the amendment, the Court would presume that
it may proceed with an adjudication on the merits unless the President states offi-
cially that such an adjudication in the particular case would embarass the conduct
of foreign policy.
S. REP. No. 1188, pt. 1, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1964); see also Metzger,Act-of-State Doctrine
Refined- The Sabbatino Case, 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 223, 244 n. 53.
Vol. 14
15
Pinard: United States Policy Regarding Nationalization of American Invest
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons,
NATIONALIZATION OF AMERICAN INVESTMENTS
4. The Hickenlooper Amendment. The Hickenlooper Amend-
ment requires the suspension of foreign aid assistance to the gov-
ernment of a State which, after taking the property of any United
States citizen or corporation which is at least fifty percent owned by
such citizens, "fails within a reasonable time . . . to take appropri-
ate steps, which may include arbitration, to discharge its obligation
under international law toward such citizen or entity, including
speedy compensation for such property in convertible foreign ex-
change equivalent to the full value thereof, as required by interna-
tional law .. ."89 Applying the Hickenlooper Amendment to the
claims/assets problem, assistance to the PRC should have been sus-
pended until the PRC made full compensation to United States
claimants for nationalized property.
C. A Summary of the Legal Implications of the PRC
Nationalization
The PRC's nationalization decree gave rise to claims by
United States nationals for full compensation. United States claim-
ants' assertion that they have a right to full compensation for assets
nationalized by the PRC finds support both under international
and United States law. Under the international law theory of ac-
quired rights, property rights acquired and recognized cannot be
abrogated without full compensation.90 If the acquired rights the-
ory were to be applied to the claims/assets problem, the United
States claimants would have a right to full compensation.
According to the Restatement, a taking by a state of the prop-
erty of an alien is wrongful under international law if there is no
reasonable provision for just compensation.9" Although United
States claimants may have a right to full compensation, whether
United States claimants receive full compensation depends upon
the applicability of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, the act
of state doctrine, and the Hickenlooper Amendment.
Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, if the United
States claimants can establish that their investments were solicited
by the PRC, the defense of foreign sovereign immunity would not
be applicable.92 Even assuming that United States claimants could
establish that their investments were solicited, application of the act
89. 76 Stat. 260 (1962), 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e) (1976).
90. See supra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
91. See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
92. See supra notes 69-80 and accompanying text.
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of state doctrine would likely bar their recovery.93
The act of state doctrine holds that a United States court can-
not review the actions of a foreign sovereign.94 Even though the act
of state doctrine prevents recovery by United States claimants, the
Hickenlooper Amendment imposes sanctions against countries
which nationalize property without providing full compensation.95
The Hickenlooper Amendment requires suspension of assist-
ance, under the foreign aid program, to foreign governments which
fail to provide for full compensation. 96 The Hickenlooper Amend-
ment was, in fact, applied to suspend foreign aid to the PRC. This
encouraged the PRC to negotiate with the United States govern-
ment concerning the settlement of the claims/assets problem.
While in principle communist countries do not recognize a re-
sponsibility for the taking of property of aliens or nationals of other
countries, their interests in international claims negotiations have,
in practice, compelled such responsibility.97 Considerations, such
as the desire to obtain funds frozen in foreign bank accounts, com-
mercial credits or foreign aid, have induced communist countries to
make lump-sum payments in settlement of claims for
expropriations.98
With reference to the claims/assets problem, such considera-
tions unquestionably encouraged the PRC to negotiate a final
claims settlement agreement. The international economic situation
of the PRC had deteriorated by 1976. Consequently, in 1977 the
PRC reinitiated diplomatic-level discussions with the United
States.99 These discussions were prompted by the fact that prior to
resolution of the claims/assets problem the PRC was not eligible
for the United States' Export-Import Bank credits.lO° Other areas of
economic assistance refused by the United States pending resolu-
tion of the claims/assets problem included benefits under the fol-
93. See supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text.
94. Id.
95. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
96. Id.
97. See generally R. LILLICH, INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS: THEIR ADJUDICATION BY NA-
TIONAL COMMISSIONS (1962); Doman, Postwar Nationalization ofForeign Property in Europe,
48 COLUM. L. REV. 1125 (1948); Drucker, The Nationalization of United Nations Property in
Europe, 36 TRANSNAT'L GROTIUS Soc'y 75 (1951).
98. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 64, § 185 reporter's note 3 (1965).
99. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
100. "Nothing in the language of the act prohibits the Export-Import Bank in dealing
with a country not recognized de jure by the United States, or with which there are not
diplomatic relations." V. LI, DE-RECOGNIZING TAIWAN: THE LEGAL PROBLEMS 21 (1977).
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lowing: (1) Overseas Private Investment Corporation;' 0 ' (2) Most-
favored-nation principle; 1 2  (3) Export Administration Act of
1969; 1°3 (4) Johnson Debt Default Act; 1°4 (5) arms transfers pro-
grams; and (6) immigration status.0 6 In view of (1) the deterio-
rating international economy of the PRC; (2) the potential
economic assistance that a resolution of the claims/assets problem
might provide; and (3) the fact that property of the PRC, such as
ships, was subject to court attachment in American territory by
United States claimants, 0 7 the incentives for settlement of the
claims/assets problem were apparent. As history reveals, these eco-
nomic incentives outweighed the ideological vision of ignoring the
obligation to compensate claimants aggrieved by a patent violation
of international law.
101. Overseas Private Investment Corporation, 22 U.S.C. § 2191 (1970) (as covered by
the provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(b), (f), (t) (1976)).
102. Most-favored-nation principle, 19 U.S.C. § 1881 (1976); see also Tariff Act of 1930,
19 U.S.C. § 1202 (1970).
103. Export Administration Act of 1969, 50 U.S.C. § 2401 (1970); 19 C.F.R. § 1341.1
(1977).
104. Johnson Debt Default Act, 18 U.S.C. § 955 (1970). The Johnson Debt Default Act
prohibits United States residents from supplying funds to countries in default on obligations
to the United States government and describes punishments to be meted out against those
who violate the proscription. Id.
105. Arms transfers are governed by several provisions that have been brought together
under a unified statutory scheme: The International Security Assistance and Arms Control
Export Act of 1976, 22 U.S.C. § 2151 (Supp. 1978).
106. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1152 (1970). For an in-depth
discussion of this provision and all of the provisions discussed in notes 100-05 supra, see V.
Li, supra note 100, at 21-30.
107. E.g., Oksenberg, The U.S. and China, in CHINA AND JAPAN: A NEW BALANCE OF
POWER 270 (D.C. Hellman ed. 1976). Claimants can also assert that sections 1605(a)(2) and
1610(b)(2) of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 provide jurisdiction to United
States courts and permit the attachment and execution of Chinese nondiplomatic property in
the U.S. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1605(a)(2), 1610(b)(2)
(1976). For an explanation of the application of § 1605(a)(2), see supra note 74. Section
1610(b)(2) reads:
(b) In addition to subsection(a), any property in the United States of an agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state engaged in commercial activity in the United
States shall not be immune from attachment in and of execution, or from execution
upon a judgment entered by a court of the United States or of a State after the
effective date of this Act, if-
(2) the judgment relates to a claim for which the agency or instrumentality is not
immune by virtue of section 1605(a)(2), (3) or (5), or 1605(b) of this chapter, regard-
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III. UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE TO THE
CLAIMS/ASSETS PROBLEM
Before the United States government could resolve the claims/
assets problem, two preliminary legal issues had to be resolved.
First, the United States government had to provide a forum in
which American citizens' claims against the PRC could be evalu-
ated. Second, it had to resolve the problem of recognition of the
PRC. Once these preliminary legal problems were resolved, the
government responded to the claims/assets problem by negotiating
the PRC Claims Agreement.
A. International Claims Settlement and the FCSC
Claims for compensation are subject to the control of the
United States national who has suffered the injury, unless and until
his claim is espoused by the United States government. 08 Accord-
ing to the Restatement, a claim is considered to have been espoused
when the United States, usually through diplomatic channels,
makes a formal claim for reparation to be paid to the United States
by the government responsible for the injury.0 9
It should also be understood that espousal is a matter of discre-
tion." 0 This discretion is vested in the President and exercised on
his behalf by the Secretary of State."Il Once a claim has been es-
poused, the President may waive or settle the claim without the ap-
proval of the claiming national." 2 Should the determination be to
settle the claim, the reparation is received and distributed by the
108. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 64, § 211.
This section reads:
When a foreign state is responsible for an injury to a national of the United
States, the resultant claim for reparation, until and unless espoused by the United
States, and except as otherwise provided by law, is subject to the control of the
national who has suffered the injury, and he is entitled to any reparation paid to
him by the foreign state.
109. Id. comment b.
110. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 64, § 212.
This section provides:
The government of the United States has discretion as to whether to espouse
the claim of a United States national for injury caused by conduct attributable to a
foreign state that is wrongful under international law. This discretion is vested in
the President and exercised on his behalf by the Secretary of State.
111. Id.
112. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 64, § 213.
The provision reads as follows:
The President may waive or settle a claim against a foreign state based on the
responsibility of the foreign state for an injury to a United States national, without
the consent of such national.
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United States government in the form of a lump-sum settlement."'
This distribution is (1) made in reasonable compliance with statu-
tory requirements, (2) not subject to judicial review, and (3) conclu-
sive as to the United States national affected."
14
In conformance with the Restatement principles, claims result-
ing from nationalizations, expropriations and other takings in vio-
lation of international law are customarily espoused by the United
States government and settled through claims settlement agree-
ments."l 5 Claims settlement agreements of the United States have
usually been executive agreements and have provided for the ap-
portioned awards of the reparation funds to individual
claimants. ' 16
Currently claims settlements in the United States mainly in-
volve the activities of the Foreign Claims Settlement Commis-
sion.' '" The FCSC was created by the President's Reorganization
Plan No. 1, which assigned the functions of the War Claims Com-
mission and the International Claims Commission to the FCSC. 18
Each time a new international claims settlement issue arises, the
International Claims Settlement Act is amended to provide for the
determination of claims of United States nationals against the for-
eign State involved." 9 The amendment relating to United States
nationals' claims against the PRC was passed in 1966.121
In 1966 the FCSC was authorized by an amendment to Title V
of the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949 to determine
such claims. 12 1 Under Title V of the Act, the FCSC was given ex-
clusive jurisdiction over the claims. 122 The FCSC was directed to
113. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 64, § 214.
This provision reads:
When the United States government receives reparation from a foreign state in
the form of a lump sum in settlement of claims arising from injuries to numerous
nationals of the United States, and distributes such sum in compliance with reason-
able procedures prescribed by a statute that provides that such distribution shall not
be subject to judicial review, the distribution is conclusive as to the United States
nationals affected.
114. Id.
115. Id. reporter's note 2.
116. Id.
117. International Claims Settlement Act of 1949, 22 U.S.C. § 1622 (1976).
118. Id.
119. For amendments concerning claims against Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Ruma-
nia, Italy, the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Cuba, China and the German Democratic Re-
public, see International Claims Settlement Act of 1949, 22 U.S.C. §§ 1623-44 (1976).
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"receive and determine the claims of United States nationals
against the PRC, arising since October 1, 1949. ' I23
United States nationals with claims against the PRC were di-
rected to follow filing procedures outlined by the FCSC. 2 4 Ac-
cording to the Act, claims filed must have resulted from actions
taken by or under the authority of the Chinese Communist
regime. 125
Claims validated by the FCSC were to be paid with funds
made available by international settlements, liquidation of foreign
assets in the United States, or public funds authorized by Con-
gress.' 26 The disbursement of funds was to be made by the United
States Treasury under the direction of the FCSC.
127
In preadjudicating claims, the FCSC was to determine the
amount and validity of claims according to the 1966 amendment to
the Act.1 28 In validating claims under the 1966 amendment, the
FCSC was directed to apply "(1) the provisions of the applicable
claims agreement as provided in this subsection, and (2) the appli-
cable principles of international law, justice, and equity."'
129
"Applicable principles of international law, justice, and eq-
uity" is an elusive concept which may be clarified by a comment on
the function of the FCSC written by one of its Commissioners:
The Commission interprets these principles in its decisions
which then become precedents in the adjudication of future
cases. Thus the Commission helps to promote the development
of a consistent body of law and precedent concerning interna-
tional claims. Unlike its predecessors, the Commission is able to
utilize the cumulative judicial and administrative experiences of
its own prior programs to assure a prompt and equitable adjudi-
cation of all claims. Because of its status as a 'court of last re-
sort', its decisions assume even greater importance as 'valuable
evidences of international claims law' which manifests the pro-
gress and current status of the law of international claims and
state responsibility.'
30
123. FCSC 1972 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 24, at 417.
124. Id. at 431.
125. See id. at 417.
126. FCSC Regulations, 45 C.F.R. § 503.1(b) (1983).
127. See Lichtenstein, The Claims Settlement Agreement Between the United States and
the People's Republic of China, I CHINA L. REP. 25 (1980).
128. See FCSC 1972 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 24, at 417.
129. International Claims Settlement Act of 1949, 64 Stat. 12 (1950), 22 U.S.C. § 1623(a)
(1976).
130. See generally Re, The Foreign Claims Settlement Commission. Its Functions and Ju-
risdiction, 60 MICH. L. REV. 1079, 1101 (1962). On the matter of judicial review by the
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On the reviewability of FCSC decisions, it seems that as long as the
Commission accords procedural due process to claimants, its final
decisions will be held not reviewable.1
31
The FCSC Report of 1972 (Final Report Of The China Claims
Program) states:
The decisions of the Commission under the War Claims Act of
1948 and the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949, as
well as under all other statutes administered, are final and con-
clusive on all questions of law and fact and are not subject to
review by any other official, department, agency, or any estab-
lishment of the United States, or by any court of mandamus or
otherwise. 1
32
This statement further supports the proposition that FCSC's valida-
tion of claims is not reviewable.
By amending the International Claims Settlement Act to give
the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission exclusive jurisdiction
over the claims of United States nationals against the PRC, the
United States government provided a forum in which American
citizens' claims could be evaluated. 33 Even after establishing such
a forum, the United States was still faced with the problem of
recognition.
B. Recognition
Prior to the United States' recognition of the PRC, the settle-
ment of any claims arising out of the PRC nationalization declara-
tion of 1950 was not feasible. Even though Congress gave
jurisdiction over all claims to the FCSC, the settlement of the
claims/assets problem, as with other international claims settle-
ments involving the United States, could not be achieved until a
binding international claims settlement agreement was reached.
134
For an international agreement to be enforceable, the parties to
FCSC, see Lillich, Judicial Review and the FC.S.C, 15 AD. L. REV. 72 (1963) [hereinafter
cited as Judicial Review]; see also Redick, The Jurisprudence ofthe Foreign Claims Settlement
Commission. Chinese Claims, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 728 (1973). For a discussion of the history,
procedure and role of the FCSC, see Lillich, The Foreign Claims Settlement Commission and
the Protection of Foreign Investment, 48 IowA L. REV. 779 (1963); Re, The Foreign Claims
Settlement Commission. Completed Claims Programs, 3 VA. J. INT'L L. 101 (1963) [hereinaf-
ter cited as The FCSC: Completed Claims Programs]; see also Freidberg,, ANew Technique in
the Adjudication of International Claims, 10 VA. J. INT'L L. 282 (1970).
131. Judicial Review, supra note 130, at 72.
132. FCSC 1972 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 24, at 4.
133. International Claims Settlement Act of 1949, 22 U.S.C. § 1622 (1976).
134. H. LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 24 (1977).
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such an agreement must recognize each other.'35 Hence, the
United States could not enter into a binding international claims
settlement agreement until it recognized the PRC.
The issue of recognition and its effect on the final settlement of
the claims/assets problem is not susceptable to a cursory analysis.
To facilitate a clear and comprehensive understanding of this issue,
the following section will discuss the status of the claims/assets
problem both before and after United States recognition of the
PRC.
In considering the pre-recognition status of the claims/assets
problem, three interactive circumstances will be examined: (1) the
international law of recognition, 136 (2) the United States policy to-
ward recognition of the PRC, 1'3 7 and (3) the status of blocked Chi-
nese assets in United States courts.
1 38
1. The International Law of Recognition. The international
law of recognition provides two approaches to the subject of recog-
nition. One approach is known as the "constitutive view"' 39 and
the other, the "declaratory view."' 4 °
The constitutive view provides that an entity shall be consid-
ered a State exclusively through the acts of recognition by other
States.' 4 ' This view denies a State legal existence until it has been
recognized by other States. 42 Thus, an entity having all of the
characteristics of a fully sovereign and independent State cannot
rank as an international person unless it receives recognition as
such from the existing members of the international society.
143
Under the constitutive view, although the characteristics of state-
hood gives rise to a duty to recognize, absent actual recognition
there is, in law, no new international person.' 44
The declaratory view, on the other hand, does not propose that
recognition alone brings a State into existence. 45 Supporters of
135. Id.
136. See infra notes 139-49 and and accompanying text.
137. See infra notes 149-54 and accompanying text.
138. See infra notes 155-65 and accompanying text.
139. I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 93 (2d ed. 1973).
140. Id.
141. Fitzmaurice, The General Princ~ples of International Law, Considered From the




145. J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 139 (6th ed. 1963).
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this view assert that the primary functions of recognition are (1) to
acknowledge the independence of the entity claiming to be a State
and (2) to ascertain the position of the recognizing State toward
such an independent State. 146 Under this view, recognition signals
the recognizing State's readiness to accept the normal consequences
of recognition, namely, the extension of the usual courtesies of in-
ternational intercourse.
147
The conflict between these two views becomes significant when
determining whether or not there is a duty to recognize a political
community or State entity. Article III of the Convention of Rights
and Duties of States supports the declaratory view in delineating
the requirements of statehood. 148 This, however, is not the last
word on the subject. Consequently, States may have their own
opinions on the duty to extend recognition to an entity that meets
the requirements of statehood.
The United States maintains a position on recognition that is
contrary to the position that the factual requirements of statehood
give rise to a legal duty to grant recognition. The United States'
position may be found in section 99(1) of the Restatement which
provides: "A state is not required by international law to recognize
an entity as a state or regime as the government of a state." ' 49 The
position of the United States on recognition becomes clearer upon
an examination of United States policy with regard to recognition
of the PRC.
2. The United States Policy Toward Recognition of the PRC.
The United States government maintained a policy of nonrecogni-
tion of the PRC for many years. The United States accorded only
defacto recognition until official recognition in 1979.50 The effect
of such recognition was to concede that the PRC maintained terri-
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Convention on Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097, T.S. No.
881, 165 L.N.T.S. 19.
149. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 64, § 99(i).
150. See EASTASIA: U.S. Normalizes Relations With the People's Republic of China, 79
DEP'T ST. BULL., Jan. 1979, at 25 [hereinafter cited as U.S. Normalizes Relations With the
People's Republic of China]. See also Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between P.R. C.
and U.S.A., PEKING REV. Dec. 22, 1978 at 8, 8-9. For an in-depth discussion of the United
States policy of nonrecognition, see Tsen-ming, Is the Policy of Non-Recognition Consistent
With Rules of International Law?, I ANNALS CHINESE SOC'Y INT'L L. 40 (1964).
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torial control of the Chinese mainland.' 5 ' Prior to 1979, the ab-
sence of a de jure recognition of the PRC also marked the
nonexistence of the PRC's right to maintain title and control over
assets situated in the United States.'52 The PRC was also denied
the right to bring proceedings in United States courts, as were its
nationals. 
53
Clearly, the United States follows the constitutive view of rec-
ognition, and for all intents and purposes, accorded to the PRC a de
facto recognition from 1949 until 1979.'1 4 Without more formal
recognition, the PRC and its nationals were also denied standing in
United States courts. 1
55
3. The Status of Blocked Chinese Assets in United States
Courts. In order to highlight the status of blocked Chinese assets in
the United States, court decisions made prior to PRC recognition
must be examined. The PRC and the Nationalist government both
filed suits in United States courts, claiming both government and
corporate assets which were blocked in the United States.
In Bank of China v. Wells Fargo Bank and Union Trust Com-
pany,56 the PRC and the Nationalist government brought suit to
recover the same assets blocked by the Treasury Department in
1950. The Bank of China had been organized in 1912 under Chi-
nese law. 157 At that time, the Imperial Chinese government was the
owner of two-thirds of the Bank's stock, and the Wells Fargo Bank
and Union Trust Company was the depository for a substantial
sum of the corporation's money.' 58 When the PRC gained control
of mainland China, the Bank's main office was moved to Hong
Kong, and PRC authorities subsequently took over the former
151. Wright, The Chinese Recognition Problem, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE TWENTI-
ETH CENTURY 602 (L. Gross ed. 1968).
152. Id.
153. Bank of China v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co., 92 F. Supp. 920 (N.D. Cal.
1950), aff'd, 190 F.2d 1010 (9th Cir. 195 1),judgment rendered, 104 F. Supp. 59 (N.D. Cal.
1952), modfed & afi'd, 209 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1953). Chase National Bank v. Directorate
General of Postal Remittance & Savings Bank, 112 N.Y.S.2d 14 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1950), modi-
fied, 278 A.D. 820, 824; 105 N.Y.S.2d 416, reh'g granted, 278 A.D. 936, 105 N.Y.S.2d 924,
orig. determination upheld, 278 A.D. 935, 105 N.Y.S.2d 923, motion for leave to appeal denied,
279 A.D. 576, 107 N.Y.S.2d 542 (1951). See also infra notes 156-65 and accompanying text.
154. U.S Normalizes Relations with the People's Republic of China, supra note 150.
155. Chase National Bank, 105 N.Y.S.2d at 923.
156. Bank of China v. Wells Fargo Bank and Union Trust Co., 92 F.Supp. 920 (N.D.
Cal. 1950).
157. Id at 921.
158. Id at 922.
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main office.' 59 Thus, there existed two main offices for the corpora-
tion, one under PRC control and the other under the control of the
Nationalist government in Hong Kong. When the Hong Kong di-
rectors brought suit to recover the deposit with the Wells Fargo
Bank, the PRC claimed that it was the rightful recipient of the
deposit. 16
0
The case was originally brought in the United States district
court in California in 1950.161 The court continued the case sine
die 162 rather than decide the rightful representative and recipient of
the Bank of China claim. The opinion of the court is significant in
its treatment of the problem with which it was faced. According to
the court: "The only solution which gives promise of affording pro-
tection to the Bank of China, its stockholders, depositors, and at the
same time supporting the foreign policy of the United States, is to
leave these funds where they are for the present."'
' 63
Although the final result of the litigation was to award the
funds to the Nationalist government, the court's initial nonresolu-
tion of the problem was very significant. It was apparent that the
district court, in the absence of an executive determination regard-
ing recognition, was avoiding a determination of ownership of Chi-
nese assets blocked in the United States. Two possible reasons for
this decision were that (1) the United States courts were not in a
position to make a factual determination of ownership because of
the lack of necessary information and (2) a determination based
upon United States policy toward the Nationalist government or
the PRC would necessarily have had complex international polit-
ical repercussions.
The United States clearly was not willing to place itself in a
contest between the two "Chinas" over rightful ownership of the
blocked assets. The United States courts logically awaited recogni-
tion of the PRC before allowing the adjudication of cases involving
blocked Chinese assets in the United States. An executive determi-
nation, such as recognition, was judicially necessary to preclude the
Nationalist government from seeking a resolution to the problem of
159. Id.
160. Id
161. Id at 920.
162. This term literally means "without day," but as used here, it refers to the final dis-
missal of a cause without appointing a day for defendant to reappear, thus discharging him
from any further appearance in court. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1242 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
163. 92 F. Supp. 920. See R. SWIFT, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CURRENT AND CLASSIC 66-
70 (1969).
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the blocked Chinese assets in United States courts.
64
Prior to PRC recognition, the PRC and its nationals were de-
nied standing to sue in United States courts. The Nationalist gov-
ernment was formerly the only recognized representative of China
with standing in United States courts. 165 Therefore, prior to PRC
recognition, if the United States had released the frozen Chinese
assets, the Nationalist government would have claimed these assets.
This would have removed $80.5 million from United States juris-
diction which could have been used to partially satisfy investors'
claims against the PRC. By withholding blocked Chinese assets,
the United States retained some bargaining power over the PRC.
Once the United States recognized the PRC, it was then able to
use the blocked assets as leverage in its negotiations of a solution to
the claims/assets problem. It is highly likely that the blocked Chi-
nese assets played an important role in resolving the claims/assets
problem since the PRC Claims Agreement provides for a lump-
sum payment to the United States of $80.5 million, which approxi-
mately equals the value of the blocked Chinese assets.
1 66
C. The Agreement
Considering of the significance of United States recognition of
the PRC in the settlement of the claims/assets problem, it is not
surprising that negotiations for the final resolution began almost
immediately after recognition on January 1, 1979.167 Negotiations
continued until May 11, 1979, when the Agreement was signed by
PRC Finance Minister Zhang Jingfu and U.S. Commerce Secretary
Juanita Kreps.
68
Article II outlines the actions to be taken by the two govern-
ments under the Agreement. Under Article II, the PRC agreed to
pay a lump sum of $80.5 million to the United States govern-
164. This is true since an Executive determination that the People's Republic of China
was the representative of the Chinese government would deny the Nationalist government
standing to bring suit in United States courts. The United States recognized the Nationalist
government from 1928 through 1978. In 1979 the U.S. State Department officially recog-
nized the People's Republic of China as the government of China. See supra note 40. See
also Accord Reached on Assets, supra note 41.
165. Since the Nationalist government was officially recognized by the United States
State Department, no other representative of the Chinese nation was granted standing to sue
in United States courts. Accord Reached on Assets, supra note 41.
166. See supra note 19.
167. See supra note 40.
168. PRC Claims Agreement, supra note 6.
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ment. 169 The United States correspondingly agreed to accept this
as full and final settlement of all of the claims specified in Article I
of the Agreement. 70 Further, the United States agreed to release
the assets which had remained blocked since the initial action of
the Treasury Department under the direction of President Truman
in 1950.171
Provisions for the PRC to make installment payments to the
United States government over a five-year period were included in
Article III. Under this payment schedule, the PRC was to make an
initial payment of $30 million and thereafter to pay the $50.5 mil-
lion balance in five annual installments of $10.1 million. 172 The
final installment is to be paid on October 1, 1984.173
Through this payment procedure the PRC receives what West-
ern investors would refer to as an interest-free loan.1 74 Although
the concepts of interest and appreciation do not play as significant a
role in the PRC as they do in the United States' market economy,
the interest-free time-deferred payment permitted by the Agree-
ment poses equity considerations to the Western economist. The
equity of the payment procedure, to Western thinking, is nonexis-
tent. The actual benefit, although small, inures to the PRC, while
the burden or loss, which is substantially greater, falls upon the the
United States claimants.
In Article IV of the Agreement, the United States government
was given exclusive authority to distribute the payments made by
the PRC.175 This comports with the foreign relations law of the
United States.'76 This Article of the Agreement gave extensive and
nonreviewable control to the United States government which exer-
cises its authority through the FCSC and the Treasury
Department. 177
Article V included provisions whereby, after the effective date
169. Id. art. 11(a).
170. Id.
171. Id. art. 11(b).
172. Id. art. III.
173. Id. art. III. Although not explicitly stated in the PRC Claims Agreement, the date
has been calculated by applying the provisions of Article III. Id.
174. By allowing the PRC to defer payment of 50.5 million dollars of the 80.5 million
dollar lump-sum payment, while at the same time failing to charge interest on the unpaid
portions, the United States has in effect loaned 50.5 million dollars to the PRC for five years,
interest-free.
175. PRC Claims Agreement, supra note 6, art. IV.
176. See supra note 113.
177. See supra notes 109-33 and accompanying text.
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of the Agreement, neither government would present to the other
any claim which was covered by the Agreement. 7 8 In substance,
Article V expressed the finality of the Agreement as a settlement of
claims between the two countries. The final section of the Agree-
ment, Article VI, declared the effective date of the Agreement to be
the date of its signing, May 11, 1979.179
The PRC Claims Agreement is a lump-sum settlement which
provides United States claimants with 41 cents on every dollar of
their preadjudicated award. Hence, the PRC Claims Agreement
does not provide full compensation to American investors for prop-
erty nationalized by the PRC. As a result of this lack of full com-
pensation, United States claimants may seek to challenge the
legality of the PRC Claims Agreement.
IV. CLAIMANTS THEORIES FOR RECOVERY AGAINST THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Claimants who are dissatisfied with the 41-cents-per-dollar re-
covery have three possible theories of recovery against the United
States government. First, claimants may argue that President
Carter lacked the power to enter into a settlement agreement con-
cerning the property of United States citizens without the express
authority of Congress. 8 0 Second, claimants may assert the PRC
Claims Agreement does not supply full compensation for assets na-
tionalized. Therefore, another type of settlement should have been
made. '8 Third, claimants may assert that the Agreement does not
provide full compensation for the taking of property rights which
allegedly arose when the FCSC validated their claims against the
PRC. Therefore, the PRC Claims Agreement is arguably in viola-
tion of the due process clause of the United States Constitution.
A. Lack of Presidential Power to Enter into the Agreement
Claimants may argue that President Carter lacked the power
to enter into a settlement agreement concerning the property of
United States citizens without the express consent of Congress. The
government could rebut this argument by asserting that President
Carter's activities were a valid exercise of his implied power to con-
duct foreign relations.
178. PRC Claims Agreement, supra note 6, art. V.
179. Id.
180. See infra notes 182-99 and accompanying text.
181. See infra notes 200-30 and accompanying text.
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The President's power to enter into executive agreements, such
as the PRC Claims Agreement, without obtaining the express con-
sent of Congress has been contested on a number of previous occa-
sions.' 82 The most recent precedent supporting this Presidential
power is a 1981 Supreme Court decision.'83
Dames & Moore v. Regan involved President Reagan's actions
with regard to the national emergency created by the Iranian hos-
tage crisis.' 84 The dispute involved various executive orders and
regulations by which the President: (1) nullified attachments and
liens on Iranian assets in the United States, (2) directed these assets
be transferred to Iran, and (3) suspended claims against Iran that
might have been presented to an international claims tribunal such
as the FCSC. 8 5
In Dames & Moore, the Supreme Court upheld the actions of
the President. 86 The Court reasoned that: (1) the Restatement
(Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States recog-
nized the President's power to "waive or settle a claim against a
foreign state . . . even without the consent of the [injured] na-
tional";'87 (2) "[t]he practice of settling claims is supported by the
fact that since 1952 the President has entered into at least 10 bind-
ing settlements with foreign nations, including an $80 million set-
tlement with the People's Republic of China"; 88  (3) the
demonstration of Congress' continuing acceptance of the Presi-
dent's claim settlement authority could be found in Congress' fre-
quent amendments to the International Claims Settlement Act;
189
and (4) in addition to congressional acquiescence to the President's
power to settle claims, the Court had previously also recognized
that the "President does have some measure of power to enter into
executive agreements without obtaining express congressional
consent." 190
The landmark precedent cited by the Court involved the Litvi-
182. See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1941); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S.
324 (1937). In these cases, the Supreme Court ruled that the Litvinov Assignment with the
Soviet Union in 1937 had legal effect in United States courts. This assignment had been
entered into by the President without congressional approval.




187. See supra note 112.
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nov Assignment which settled claims arising out of Russian nation-
alization decrees and is notably analogous to the present claims/
assets problem. The case, United States v. Pink, was decided by the
Court in 1941.19' The rule stated in Pink is:
The powers of the President in respect to the recognition of a
foreign government, includes the power to remove such obstacles
to full recognition as the settlement of claims of our nationals
... . The powers of the President in the conduct of foreign rela-
tions included the power, without the consent of the Senate, to
determine the public policy of the United States with respect to
the Russian nationalization decrees.
19 2
Since the circumstances of the Litvinov Assignment are analogous
to the circumstances of the PRC Claims Agreement, a United
States court would likely hold that the PRC Claims Agreement was
a valid exercise by the President of his executive power to conduct
foreign relations.
Claimants, however, could argue that the signing of the PRC
Claims Agreement infringed upon the congressional power to regu-
late foreign commerce. 193 This argument was raised in United
States v. Guy W. Capps Inc., a fourth circuit case decided in
1953. 94 There, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the
lower court stating that "the congressional power to regulate for-
eign commerce is not a limitation to presidents' implied powers."1
95
In Consumer's Union of the United States Inc. v. Rogers, the
Supreme Court further stated that the President was vested with the
independent authority normally reserved for Congress so long as
his activities are sufficiently connected with the furtherance of in-
ternational relations.
196
Under the foregoing authorities, President Carter's negotiation
of the PRC Claims Agreement could be held proper for two rea-
sons. First, President Carter's prerecognition negotiations involv-
ing the claims/assets problem were conducted in the interest of
removing obstacles to recognition of the PRC.' 97 The negotiations,
therefore, were made in the interest of furthering United States for-
191. Pink, 315 U.S. at 203.
192. Id. at 205. See also Cardozo, The Authority on Law of International Treaties.- The
Pink Case, 13 SYRACUSE L. REV. 544 (1962).
193. This argument was raised in United States v. Guy W. Capps Inc., 204 F.2d 655 (4th
Cir. 1953), afe'd, 348 U.S. 296 (1955).
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Consumer's Union of U.S., Inc. v. Rogers, 352 F. Supp. 1319, 1323 (D.D.C. 1973).
197. Pink, 315 U.S. at 229.
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eign relations with the PRC. Second, the postrecognition negotia-
tions and subsequent Agreement were sufficiently connected with
furthering of international relations as to vest in the President the
independent authority normally reserved for Congress. 9 '
The conspicuous absence of congressional disapproval lends
additional support to the validity of the Agreement. According to
the Dames & Moore decision, the frequent amendment by Congress
of the International Claims Settlement Act demonstrates Congress'
continuing acceptance of the President's claims settlement
authority. 199
The Agreement, therefore, stands as a valid exercise of the
President's powers absent congressional approval or authorization.
This is so because: (1) it was made with respect to the recognition of
a foreign government and (2) by settling the claims of United States
nationals, it attempted to remove obstacles to de jure recognition
and the subsequent furtherance of international relations.
B. Sufficiency of the Lump-Sum Settlement
Claimants may also argue that since the PRC Claims Agree-
ment did not provide full compensation for assets nationalized, an-
other type of settlement should have been made. The opposing
argument holds that the lump-sum settlement agreement sidesteps
many of he difficulties which accompany an assignment-type settle-
ment agreement.2 1 Since an assignment-type settlement is the only
other type of settlement which could have been considered in the
resolution of the claims/assets problem, claimants would not likely
prevail on this theory.
The clearest example of the difficulties which accompany an
assignment-type agreement is the Litvinov Assignment. 20 ' This
198. 352 F. Supp. at 1319.
199. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 654. Absence of congressional disapproval also sup-
ports the President's authority to enter into the PRC Claims Agreement without the express
approval of Congress. See also N.Y. Times, Mar. 2, 1979, at A5, col. 1. which reported that
[tihe normalization of U.S.-PRC relations was generally favored in Congress, and
no congressional resistance to the Agreement has developed. A challenge to the
Executive's authority could still come, however, from U.S. claimants dissatisfied
with the Agreement's $0.41 per dollar compensation terms.
200. For a discussion of these difficulties, see Comment, Assignment of Claims by the
Russian Government to the United States, 28 AM. J. INT'L L. 545 (1934) [hereinafter cited as
Comment, Assignment of Claims]; Note, The Effect Since Recognition of Soviet Decrees on
Property Located in the United States, 4 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 355 (1936); Comment, Interna-
tional Law-Soviet Decrees Nationalizing Russian Insurance Companies-Assignment of As-
sets to the United States-Extraterritoriality, 13 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 163 (1938).
201. See Comment, Assignment of Claims, supra note 200.
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Agreement was employed by the United States in the settlement of
claims arising out of the nationalization of United States nationals'
property in Russia in the 1930's.2"2 The Litvinov Assignment was
not sufficiently determinative and final with regard to the claims it
was designed to settle. The result was extensive litigation by
United States and USSR nationals over the bilateral claims suppos-
edly settled by the Agreement.20 3
In addition to avoiding the postagreement litigation of an as-
signment-type settlement, there were four other factors which con-
tributed to the choice of a lump-sum agreement. First of all, the
socioeconomic situation of the PRC provided little confidence that
any funds in excess of those blocked in the United States would
ever become available for negotiation purposes. 2° Second, the in-
adequacy of the funds available for negotiation was not an issue of
first impression for the FCSC, since most all foreign settlement pro-
grams have provided a less than full payment on claims.2 5 Third,
the United States government was not required to compensate its
nationals for the difference between the amount of validated claims
and the actual amount of funds received under any lump-sum set-
tlement.20 6 Fourth, a large portion of total claims held by a rela-
tively small number of claimants suggested the possibility of
mitigation with regard to the satisfaction of those claims.20 7
1. The Socioeconomic Situation of the PRC. The likelihood
that the PRC would be willing to transfer any funds in excess of
those blocked in the United States was slight. As one commentator
concluded:
[T]he particular circumstances of Chinese history, including une-
qual treaties, foreign commercial domination as a general result
of the inferior military position of China, and the general Com-
munist opposition to the cultural and political imperialism and
exploitation which allegedly accompanied many of these finan-
cial and educational activities, will have their impact on an ac-
ceptable settlement of claims. Moreover, in order to accept as
valid all certified claims, the PRC would have to admit that cer-
202. See Comment, Recognition ofRussia, 28 AM. J. INT'L L. 90 (1934); see also Com-
ment, Russian Claims Negotiations, 29 Am. J. Int'l L. 290 (1935); see generally Comment,
Assignment of Claims, supra note 200.
203. Id.
204. See infra notes 208-09 and accompanying text.
205. See infra notes 210-17 and accompanying text.
206. See infra notes 218-25 and accompanying text.
207. See infra notes 226-30 and accompanying text.
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tain of its previous governmental decrees were against interna-
tional law; for example, the claims resulting from the de facto
"ransom" demands of the PRC would seem particularly
troublesome.
If one sets the present day value of claims, with interest, at
$400,000,000, China would have difficulty, in the absence of an
overall trade package with the United States in securing the for-
eign exchange to settle them, even if it should wish to do so.
While the United States might settle for Chinese payment over a
period of twenty years, as in the case of Poland, and more re-
cently in the case of Hungary, China may not be willing to ac-
cept such a long-term debt. Moreover, with the PRC now
entering an expansive period of foreign policy, the need for
$100-200 million annual foreign exchange surplus will be even
greater.2 °s
In a practical sense, the PRC could not afford to remit full
compensation to the United States in settlement of the claims/as-
sets problem. Thus, the socioeconomic status of the PRC supported
the negotiation of a lump-sum settlement.20 9
2. Inadequacy of Funds Not an Issue of First Impressionfor
the FCSC. The inadequacy of funds did not present a great diffi-
culty in the settlement of the claims/assets problem. Most of the
foreign claims settlement agreements prior to the claims/assets res-
olution had not, in fact, provided full value compensation to claim-
ants.210 At the time of the PRC Claims Agreement, settlements had
already been concluded with Yugoslavia,2 I' Rumania,21 2 Bulga-
208. Redick, supra note 130, at 739.
209. Id.
210. See infra notes 211-15 and accompanying text.
211. The United States accepted payment of 17 million dollars on 876 certified claims
totalling $18,817,890 exclusive of interest. A total of 1,556 claims were originally filed.
Claims Settlement Agreement, July 19, 1948, United States-Yugoslavia, 62 Stat. 2658,
T.I.A.S. No. 1803. See ClayAspects of Settling Claims Under the Yugoslav Claims Agreement
of 1948, 48 GEO. L.J. 582 (1955); Coerper, The Foreign Claims Settlement Commission and
Judicial Review, 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 868 (1956); The FCSC: Completed Claims Programs,
supra note 130, at 105.
212. The United States accepted a lump sum of $24,526,370 as the final settlement of all
claims against Rumania. With interest, these claims amounted to 85 million dollars. The
fund was made up of blocked assets plus an additional 2.5 million dollars payable in five
installments between July 1, 1960, and July 1, 1964. The 498 certified claims received ap-
proximately a 219% return of which 26% came from the additional 2.5 million dollar pay-
ment. Claims Settlement Agreement, Mar. 30, 1960, United States-Rumania, I I U.S.T. 317,
T.I.A.S. No. 4451. See Christenson, The United States-Rumanian Claims Settlement Agree-
ment of/March 30, 1960, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 617 (1961).
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ria2 13 and Poland.21 4 None of these settlements provided for full
compensation. 215 In fact, of all the foreign claims settlement agree-
ments that preceeded the PRC Claims Agreement, there are only
two settlements with Communist countries in which higher returns
were paid.2 6 Both of these settlements are distinguishable by rea-
son of special circumstances.2 17
3. Nonliabityfor Disbursement to Claimants of Less-than-Full
Value for Validated Claims. There is little possibility of any suc-
cessful litigation against the United States government for its deci-
sion to negotiate a less-than-full settlement with the PRC. As
previously discussed, the foreign relations law of the United States
does not impose a requirement on the United States government to
settle the international claims of its nationals.218 Instead, espousal
is a matter of discretion vested in the President. 219 Further, once a
claim has been espoused, the President may waive or settle the
claim without the approval of the injured national. 22°  Finally,
should the President decide to settle the claim, the lump-sum repa-
ration would be distributed by the United States government.22'
The distribution must be: (1) in reasonable compliance with statu-
213. The U.S.-Bulgarian Agreement of 1963 was a lump sum settlement of $3,543,398.
There were 391 claims filed with the FCSC, of which only 217 were certified. The total value
of certified claims was $6,571,825 which represented $4,684,187 of principal and $1,887,638
of interest. The $3,543,398 lump sum was composed of $3,143,398 worth of blocked assets in
the U.S., and the additional $400,000 was supplied by an additional payment by the Bulga-
rian government. This total represented a 53.9% return on the total value of claims as estab-
lished by the FCSC. Claims Settlement Agreement, July 2, 1963, United States-Bulgaria, 14
U.S.T. 969, T.I.A.S. No. 5387.
214. Claims Settlement Agreement, July 16, 1960, United States-Poland, II U.S.T. 1953,
T.I.A.S. No. 4545. The Agreement provided that 40 million dollars be paid to the United
States government over a 20 year period beginning in January 1961. There were 5,147 certi-
fied claims, only half of the approximate 10,169 claims which had been filed. The value of
certified claims was $100,737,581. The approximate return paid on FCSC awards was 36%.
See FCSC 1972 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 24, at 3435; see also Note, The American-Polish
Claims Agreement of 1960, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 452 (1961).
215. See supra notes 211-15 and accompanying text.
216. One of these settlements was the Yugoslav Settlement of 1948. This settlement
yielded approximately 90 cents on the dollar. In that case, the United States agreed to give
Yugoslavia 40 million dollars in gold, which the United States held, when the Yugoslavian
government paid the 17 million dollars in cash. The next highest percentage return settle-
ment was the Bulgarian settlement which involved a cash payment of $400,000 and yielded
73 cents on the dollar. See Mundheim, supra note 41.
217. Id.






Pinard: United States Policy Regarding Nationalization of American Invest
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons,
NATIONALIZATION OF AMERICAN INVESTMENTS
tory requirements, (2) not subject to judicial review, and (3) conclu-
sive as to the affected United States national.222
The decision by the Court of Claims in Seery v. United States,
also supports nonliability for the United States government's obli-
gation to its nationals for negotiating a less-than-full settlement.223
In a special report involving the American-Turkish Claims Settle-
ment, the nonliability issue was clearly stated: "A state is under no
obligation to its nationals in the international settlement of the
claims of those nationals. Any amount received seems legally to be
a national fund on which no claimant has a lien."' 224 Therefore,
since the United States government has no liability to its nationals
for a less-than-full settlement, a lump-sum settlement gains even
greater support. A final factor which arguably supported the nego-
tiation of a lump-sum settlement agreement was the "deep pocket"
nature of those claimants holding the largest claims.
22 5
4. Large Portion of Total Claims Held Disproportionately by
Few Claimants-Mitigating Aspects. Considering the previously
discussed factors supporting a lump-sum settlement, the probability
of a such a settlement raised the question of how an equitable dis-
bursement of the inadequate funds would be effected. A break-
down of the total claims reveals an important mitigating factor in
this respect. Sixteen claimants held $116 million of the $197 mil-
lion of FCSC certified claims. 226 This fact may be responsible for
the FCSC's three-part fund disbursement procedure which pro-
vides a progressively smaller percentage return on claims of pro-
222. id.
223. Seery v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 601 (Ct. Cl. 1955); see also A. NIELSON, AMERI-
CAN-TURKISH CLAIMS SETTLEMENT, OPINIONS AND REPORTS (1937).
224. See A. NIELSON, supra note 223, at 4-5.
225. See generally W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS (4th ed. 1971).
226. The FCSC determined that the following corporations have certified losses of one
million dollars or more:
1. Shanghai Power Company $ 53,832,885
2. Esso Standard $ 27,026,602
3. Caltex Limited $ 5,443,700
4. IT&T Corporation $ 7,765,315
5. General Electric Company $ 4,546,200
6. International Standard Electric Corporation $ 3,228,853
7. Western District Power Company Shanghai $ 1,758,685
8. First National City Bank $ 1,562,145
9. Shanghai Wharf and Warehouse Company $ 1,042,862
Total $116,207,447
FCSC 1972 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 24, at 508.
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portionately greater value.227 This procedure spreads losses to
"deep pockets," but is supported by the fact that should additional
funds somehow become available, each claimant stands to receive
full compensation for his claim.228 The countervailing argument is
that in most claims settlements agreements, additional funds rarely
become available.
229
The preceeding factors, viewed in the light of the litigation ac-
companying the Litvinov Assignment, augured for a lump-sum set-
tlement of the claims/assets problem. The use of a lump-sum
settlement was arguably the most effective method for final resolu-
tion of the claims/assets problem and created little or no interna-
tional diplomatic turmoil. The issue of domestic turmoil, however,
is another matter.
Under the present analysis, claimants who are dissatisfied with
a less-than-full value settlement may present one additional theory
for recovery against the United States government. Claimants
could argue that the Agreement violated the United States
Constitution.23 °
C. The Constitutionality of the Agreement
Claimants could argue that the Agreement violated the United
States Constitution. Claimants could assert that in preadjudicating
their claims, the "awards" granted by the FCSC conferred upon
them a property right.231 The basis of this contention is the due
process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth
amendment.232
Assuming the awards of the FCSC conferred property rights,
claimants could assert that since they receive only 41 cents per dol-
lar on their awards, the United States government has deprived
them of fifty-nine percent of their property without due process.
Claimants could assert the absence of due process on the ground
that they had nothing to say about the settlement of their claims.
This contention, however, is unpersuasive since the Restate-
ment (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States sup-
227. See Lichtenstein, supra note 127.
228. See FCSC 1972 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 24, at 32.
229. However, this would entail renegotiation of the PRC Claims Agreement. Addi-
tional funds of this kind have not been supplied after the initial settlement of any of the
previous claims settlement agreements. See supra notes 210-17 and accompanying text.
230. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
231. But see supra notes 223-24 and accompanying text.
232. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Vol. 14
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ports: (1) the government's discretionary espousal of the claims of
its nationals,233 (2) the nonreviewability of the distribution of repa-
ration to nationals whose claims have been espoused and settled,
234
and (3) the finality of a settlement made by the government as to
the affected national.
235
Claimants could also raise an equal protection argument based
on the procedure established by the FCSC for the disbursement of
funds to United States claimants. 236 The procedure provides all
holders of awards of one thousand dollars or less are to be paid in
full, while holders of larger awards receive only one thousand dol-
lars plus a prorated portion of the remaining funds available for
disbursement.237 Claimants could argue that holders of the former
claims are receiving full compensation, while holders of larger
awards are suffering a loss which actually increases with the size of
those awards. Therefore, claimants could assert that the fund dis-
bursement procedure violated the equal protection clause of the
United States Constitution.
The foreign relations law of the United States, however, sup-
ports the actions of espousal, settlement and ultimate disbursement
of reparation for claims of United States nationals arising out of
takings in violation of international law.2 31 Claimants, therefore,
would likely not be successful in their constitutional arguments.
D. Summary
In conclusion, claimants who are dissatisfied with a "mere"
forty-one-percent payment on their FCSC-certified claims have no
standing to sue. 2 3 9 Further, the PRC Claims greement appears to,standimg to sue ,%_c%_L aprsto
be a valid exercise of the President's executive power and can not
be nullified on the grounds of an absence of such power.2 ' The
provisions of the PRC Claims Agreement provide the United States
claimants with no possibility of future adjudication of their claims
in the PRC. In addition, the decisions of the FCSC and the man-
ner of fund disbursement utilized by the United States Treasury
233. See supra notes 110-14 and accompanying text.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. See FCSC 1972 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 24, at 725.
237. See Lichtenstein, supra note 127.
238. See supra notes 110-14 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 182-237 and accompanying text.
240. See supra notes 182-99 and accompanying text.
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Department are not reviewable.24' Consequently, claimants will
likely be unsuccessful in obtaining full compensation since the PRC
Claims Agreement is final and binding. However, since the PRC
Claims Agreement provided for only 41 cents on each dollar of
FCSC certified claims, this inadequate compensation gives rise to
the question of whether United States policy regarding claims set-
tlement agreements should be changed.
V. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Generally, the United States seeks to encourage foreign rela-
tions. Since foreign relations includes both diplomatic and eco-
nomic relations, claims settlement agreements should also consider
both types of relations. The PRC Claims Agreement successfully
encouraged diplomatic relations by allowing the United States to
avoid adjudicating whether the PRC was in violation of interna-
tional law. Such an adjudication would have been an insult, seri-
ously injuring foreign relations between the United States and the
PRC.
On the other hand, the PRC Claims Agreement seemingly has
failed to properly weigh the importance of economic relations be-
tween the United States and the PRC. By providing inadequate
compensation to United States nationals for nationalized property,
the Agreement has not furthered the economic aspect of foreign
relations. It is unquestioned that without the security of a full com-
pensation requirement, United States private investment in foreign
countries will be chilled.242
With the exception of terrorism, the event most feared by the
entrepreneur doing business in a developing country is the expro-
priation of his property.243 In various studies concerning private
investment in developing countries, the risk of expropriation con-
sistently ranked highest in the category of risks which deter foreign
investment. 2" These risks, studies have shown, are very real. In
the late 1960's a study of Fortune 500 companies disclosed that 187
of these companies had experienced an expropriation since the end
241. See supra notes 108-33 and accompanying text.
242. See infra notes 243-46 and accompanying text.
243. See, e.g., W. CLARKE, PRIVATE ENTERPRISE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 31-44
(1965). Other noneconomic risks include war, revolution and exchange control regulation.
Economic risks include such things as inflation, currency devaluation and inconvertibility of
currency. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC Co-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, INVESTING
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of World War 1.245 A research study by the State Department simi-
larly indicated that there had been at least eighty-six instances of
expropriation and related activity between July 1971 and July
1973.246 The absence of internationally applicable standards re-
garding the settlement of expropriations has done little to alleviate
the chilling effect of possible expropriation or nationalization has
had upon foreign investment in developing countries.
It is uncontested that the United States' policy throughout the
post-World War II period has been to assist the developing coun-
tries in successfully meeting their developmental goals.247 This pol-
icy, although somewhat altruistic, manifests a sense of enlightened
self-interest in that it recognizes that where legitimate aspirations of
developing countries are frustrated, the likelihood of a comfortable
world order is slight. In addition, the United States policy exhibits
a conviction that substantial flows of private capital, with the tech-
nology, know-how and management skills that accompany it, are
essential to this development process.24 Although bilateral and
multilateral governmental aid is not insignificant, private resource
transfers are an essential element.249
Inadequate compensation for expropriations and nationaliza-
tions constitutes a major threat to these essential private invest-
ments.25" This threat exists because private investors come from
environments, such as the United States, where private property
rights are recongized as the most significant benefits of citizenship
and are protected accordingly. It is therefore unrealistic to suppose
that investors will forego such protection by continually placing
their assets at risk in countries where private property rights are not
accorded similar protections.
In order to foster continued high levels of foreign investment
245. Root, The Expropriation Experience ofAmerican Companies: What Happened to 38
Companies, Bus. HORIZONS, Apr. 1968, at 69. The greatest disputes have involved Latin and
South American countries, perhaps beginning with the Mexican nationalizations in the
1960's and Chilean copper nationalizations in the early 1970's. Regarding two of the most
recent expropriations, one in Venezuela and one in Peru, see Gantz, The Marcona Settlement:
New Forms of Negotiation and Compensationfor Nationalized Property, 71 AM. J. INT'L L.
474 (1977) [hereinafter cited as The Marcona Settlement]; Gantz, The United States Peruvian
Claims Agreement of February 19, 1974, 10 INT'L LAW. 389 (1976); Rossi-Guerrero, The
Transition from Private to Public Control in the Venezuelan Petroleum Industry, 9 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 475 (1976).
246. The Marcona Settlement, supra note 245, at 474 n.2 (unclassified research).
247. Smith, supra note 67 at 521.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. See supra notes 243-46 and accompanying text.
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in developing countries, the United States government should take
a strong position with regard to the issues of expropriation and na-
tionalization. If economic relations between the United States and
nationalizing countries are to be furthered, full compensation for
nationalized property must be required. Moreover, the allowance
for nonpayment or reduced payment in a situation involving large-
scale nationalization proceedings may encourage further unwar-
ranted nationalizations. Such an allowance may well develop into
a defense of virtual inability to pay compensation. Toleration of
this practice, absent a motive for mere deferral of compensation,
would in turn create an incentive to take even larger sectors of the
economy. If the United States is to encourage economic relations
between itself and other countries through its private citizens, a
mechanism must be provided for a private investor to receive full
compensation for his property nationalized abroad.
In conclusion, the PRC Claims Agreement only partially en-
courages foreign relations between the United States and the PRC.
Diplomatic relations were appeased by the PRC Claims Agreement
since the United States avoided adjudicating whether the PRC was
in violation of international law. Economic relations between the
United States and the PRC, however, were weakened due to the
absence of full compensation for certified claims. Therefore,
United States policy regarding claims settlement agreements should
be changed so as to weigh equally economic relations against diplo-
matic relations.
VI. PROPOSAL
In order to properly weigh economic relations against diplo-
matic relations when making claims settlement agreements, United
States policy shoud follow a two-step analysis. First, in order to
encourage nationalizing countries to negotiate claims settlement
agreements, the United States should invoke the Hickenlooper
Amendment to suspend assistance to countries which take the
property of United States nationals without providing full compen-
sation.25' Second, in negotiating a claims settlement agreement, the
United States should require full compensation, even where such a
requirement, in view of the socioeconomic situation of the national-
izing country, would cause a great hardship. This hardship could
be avoided by permitting the nationalizing country to pay the re-
251. Foreign Assistance Act of 1971, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(1)(C) (1972).
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41
Pinard: United States Policy Regarding Nationalization of American Invest
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons,
NATIONALIZATION OF AMERICAN INVESTMENTS
quired compensation over an extended period of time. This period
should be established by applying equity principles regarding the
ability of the nationalizing country to make immediate and future
payments toward full compensation. In this way, the United States
would stand firm in its position that nationalization of United
States nationals' property without a provision for full compensation
will not be tolerated. Accordingly United States citizens would be
provided with the security that their foreign investments will be
protected. This policy will further foreign relations in the sense
that economic relations will be properly weighed and protected.
Diplomatic relations should not be overly damaged by this policy.
Further, this policy does not prohibit foreign governments from
nationalizing United States investments, but only requires full com-
pensation for such nationalization. Hence, this policy does not at-
tempt to control the acts of foreign governments. Moreover,
foreign governments would benefit from the increased United
States foreign investments encouraged under this policy.
VII. CONCLUSION
The claims/assets problem between the United States and the
PRC arose in 1950.252 On December 17, 1950, the United States
Treasury Department froze all Chinese assets and accounts in the
United States. The PRC responded by nationalizing all United
States property in China on December 28, 1950.253 United States
claimants asserted a right to full compensation for their national-
ized property.Une ...ie-t,, " nal l,,,,1,,,, ,,,, aw, the  theory ,,f^ acquired- rights--k' supports
United States claimants' assertion of the necessity of full compensa-
tion. 4 Under United States law, the Restatement (Second) of For-
eign Relations Law reiterates the claimants' entitlement to full
compensation. 255 The PRC, however, has two possible defenses to
this assertion. First, they can claim, under the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act, immunity from suit by private United States citi-
zens. Second, they can claim the act of state doctrine makes their
acts nonreviewable by United States courts. If United States claim-
ants can establish that the PRC solicited their investments, the de-
252. See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
253. See Administrative Council Order, supra note 2.
254. See supra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
1984
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fense of foreign sovereign immunity would not be available.256 The
act of state doctrine, however, if applied to the claims/assets prob-
lem would bar suit by United States claimants." 7
Although full compensation was not demanded of the PRC,
the application of the Hickenlooper Amendment to the PRC's na-
tionalization encouraged the PRC to negotiate an agreement with
the United States to resolve the claims/assets problem.25 The
United States responded to the claims/assets problem in 1966 by
establishing a forum in which American citizens' claims against the
PRC could be evaluated.25 9 This forum was the Foreign Claims
Settlement Commission, which preadjudicated the claims of United
States nationals against the PRC and certified approximately $197
million of claims for compensation. 260 However, payment on these
claims could not be made until the United States recognized the
PRC and entered into a claims settlement agreement.26'
On January 1, 1979, the United States recognized the PRC,
and a claims settlement agreement was signed by the two countries
on May 11, 1979.262 The PRC Claims Agreement resolved all bilat-
eral claims and counterclaims which arose between the two coun-
tries in 1950.263 The PRC Claims Agreement permitted the PRC to
reclaim assets and accounts which were frozen by the United States
Treasury Department in 1950.2' This Agreement also provided
that the PRC would remit to the United States government a lump-
sum payment equivalent to the value of unfrozen assets. 265 This
lump-sum payment of $80.5 million constituted only partial com-
pensation for the $197 million of United States nationals'
property.
266
The United States government espoused the claims of United
States nationals and agreed that the PRC Claims Agreement was a
full and final settlement of the claims/assets problem.2 67 For this
reason, United States nationals have no standing to contest the av-
256. See supra notes 69-80 and accompanying text.
257. See supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text.
258. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
259. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 20-29 and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
262. Id.
263. PRC Claims Agreement, supra note 6, art. 11(a).
264. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
265. Id.
266. See Administrative Council Order, supra note 2.
267. See supra note 3.
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268enerage 41 percent compensation that they receive. This compen
sation indicates that United States policy with regard to foreign
nationalizations and foreign investment fails to consider properly
the economic effects of inadequate compensation.269
Although the PRC Claims Agreement arguably furthered dip-
lomatic relations, the inadequate compensation provided has the
effect of chilling United States private foreign investment. There-
fore, it is proposed that in the future the United States require full
compensation for property taken by foreign nationalizations.
Until the United States adopts such a proposed policy, United
States foreign investors should be forewarned of the ultimate conse-
quences of the nationalization of their foreign investments. Al-
though the United States government may espouse United States
foreign investors' claims against a foreign government which na-
tionalizes their property, full compensation will not always be com-
pelled. Investors must be made aware that it may be impossible for
them to prevail when demanding full compensation for the taking
of their property abroad. Accordingly, they may have to accept a
small fraction of the value of their loss or be forced to defer receipt
of any compensation for an extended period of time.
Laurie A. Pinard*
268. See supra note 9.
269. See supra notes 242-5 i and accompanying text.
* I would like to thank Carl J. Pinard, Jr.; Alice T. Huffman and Robert L. O'Keefe
whose support and encouragement made this Comment possible.
44
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 14, No. 1 [], Art. 7
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol14/iss1/7
